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Lender Liabilitv: 
Legal and ~anagemeht Effects 
on the Hospiality Industry 
by 
John L. Myers 
and 
Bruce S. Urdang 
With the savings and loan crisis and the tail end of a recession at 
hand, the '90s are bound to be a difficult decade for the financing of 
hospitality operations through borrowing from commercial lenders. 
The authors discuss one of the least known dangers associated with 
borrowing, lender liability. The issue is discussed from both a legal 
and managerial perspective. 
Individuals involved in upper level management who have been 
properly advised by counsel are becoming increasingly aware of the 
legal issues surrounding that  relatively new area of the law 
commonly referred to as "lender liability," The rights and liabilities 
between a borrower (the hospitality management) and a lender 
(traditionally a commercial bank, savings and loan, retirement1 
pension fund, and insurance company) have changed significantly 
over recent years. 
Under certain circumstances, a lender could be held legally 
responsible to third parties for the wrongful acts or omissions of the 
borrower.' The possibility of such liability has had a profound effect 
not only on the nature of the borrowerflender relationship and the 
structure of loan agreements, but also on the decisions rendered by 
the management of hospitality operations. Management has had to 
recognize the fact that lenders are increasingly wary of becoming 
entangled in the myriad legal problems which beset all hospitality 
operations. The effect has been a significant change in management 
procedures and attitudes. 
Often the law will hold one person vicariously liable to a third 
party for the acts of another merely due to the relationship between 
the parties. One example is the liability placed upon an employer for 
the acts of his employee. Just because of the relationship, one person 
is responsible for the acts of another as if those acts were his own. 
Such vicarious liability could attach to a lender with regard to the acts 
of a borrower. For such liability to attach, the relationship between 
lender and borrower must, in many ways, be more than what one 
might consider the traditional lenderhorrower relationship. 
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Traditionally, a lender will charge interest as the consideration it 
is to receive for a loan. The only obligation placed upon the borrower 
is to re-pay the principal with the agreed-upon interest. The only 
right the lender has is to receive the sums owed. Increasingly, 
however, lenders have sought to increase the profitability of lending 
by making "participatory" loans. Lenders receive an ownership 
interest in the borrower's business, often a percentage of the profits. 
To protect that ownership interest, many such loans include the 
delegation of management responsibilities to the lender. It is such 
"participatory" loans which could result in lender liability. 
Are the Lender and Borrower Partners? 
According to the Uniform Partnership Act, all the members of a 
partnership are liable for the acts of the other partners which are 
related to the partnership business. A lender who has made a 
participatory loan to a borrower might be so entangled in the daily 
operations of the borrower that the lender appears to be a partner 
and therefore liable for the "partnership" debts. 
A partnership is defined as an association of two or more 
persons to carry on a business for profit as co-owners. The hallmarks 
of such an association are as follows: 
Intent to form a partnership: No person can be a partner with 
another without intending to do such. In this context, however, intent 
can be inferred by the parties' acts. The parties might even deny that 
they are partners; however, if they act like partners, the law will 
consider them such. 
Community of interest: This means having the right to manage 
the affairs of the business or utilize or dispose of business property. The 
key is the right to manage. Exercising that right is not necessary. 
Contrast such management authority with a lender's right to veto 
certain transactions of the borrower which in some way might endanger 
the lender's collateral. Such an arrangement would not be considered a 
community of interest and would be a "safe" right for a lender to reserve. 
Co-ownership: The most powef l  indicator of co-ownership of a 
business is the sharing of profits. ORen lenders will receive a share of 
the profits of a business as payment on the debt or interest on a loan. 
Not all such loan terms will make a lender a partner of the borrower, 
even though such a lender might look like a partner. The key, 
therefore, is the ability to distinguish loans from capital investment. 
Power of control: A creditor who takes over a debtor's business 
to collect on a debt or who is involved in the debtor's day-to-day affairs, 
might be considered the debtor's partner. A lender may appropriately 
monitor or protect its interest in collateral without running the risk of 
being branded a partner. 
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In attempting to make such an often difficult distinction, the 
single most significant factor will be whether or not the obligation to 
re-pay the funds is contingent upon the success of the business." 
Partners, in addition to sharing profits, share losses. If the 
obligation to re-pay is absolute, regardless of the success of the 
business, no co-ownership exists, even if the amount of the payments 
were to vary with the profits of the business. Such is the rule in 
nearly every state. No inference of partnership is created by the 
repayment of lent money out of the first proceeds of a business or out 
of its profits. It is where the money advanced is risked in the 
business that the courts will hold that co-ownership exists: 
Tb constitute a loan the money advanced must be returnable 
in any event .... It is not a loan if repayment is contingent upon 
the profits, for in such a case it is made not upon the personal 
responsibility of the borrower, but upon the security of the 
business; and where the money is risked in the business,it 
strongly tends to show that  the contract was one of 
partnership, and not a mere loan.3 
In many cases, lenders go further. Instead of extracting only 
interest as remuneration for a loan, they also receive profits. Such 
additional interest, in the form of profits, in and of itself does not 
transform a loan into a capital investmenL4 
One final situation involves a lender who, according to the loan 
instrument, is to continue to receive a percentage of profits of the 
borrower even after the entire principal and interest have been 
repaid. There is no case directly holding that such an arrangement 
will be tantamount to a community of interest. However, one court 
has held that one of the primary characteristics of a loan is the 
existence of principal sums out~tanding.~ The corollary to that 
proposition is that no lenderhorrower relationship can exist if there 
is no outstanding principal owed and, therefore, if the relationship is 
not one of lenderhorrower, it must be something else, such as a 
partnership. 
One can only speculate as to how such an argument might be 
received. The best advice would be to not become the test case and to 
avoid loans which permit the payment of profits after the principal 
has been repaid. Some loan transactions attempt to accomplish the 
same result by providing the lender not with a payment of profit 
after the principal is paid, but granting the lender an option to 
become a partner in the borrower's business at some specified time 
in the future. The time specified might be after the principal has 
been paid. Because the lender will exercise that option only if the 
business is, in fact, profitable, the option is in effect an agreement 
whereby the lender is agreeing to share in profits if they ensue, but 
not to share in any losses. Such an option arrangement has been 
held not to constitute a partner~hip.~ 
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Is the Borrower the Lender's Agent? 
Another ground upon which vicarious liability for the acts of a 
borrower could be thrust upon a lender is that of basic principles of 
agency law. A principal is vicariously liable for the acts of his agent 
conducted within the scope of the principal's business. To put this 
proposition of law into the context of the lender-borrower 
relationship, Section "0" of the Restatement (Second) of Agency 
states the following: 
A creditor who assumes control of his debtor's business for the 
mutual benefit of himself and his debtor, may become a 
principal, with liability for the acts and transactions of the 
debtor in connection with the business. 
An agency relationship can be created in two ways. The first is 
by consent, one person agreeing to act on behalf of another. The 
other is as stated above, by a lender exercising control over the 
business of the borrower for the mutual benefit of both. Notice that 
for such agency liability to attach, actual exercise of control, not 
merely the right to control must exist, unlike the partnership 
analysis above. The Restatement of Agency goes on to state the 
following: 
The point at which the creditor becomes a principal is that at 
which he assumes de facto control over the conduct of his 
debtor, whatever the terms of the formal contract with his 
debtor may be. 
It is important to note that a lender who acts merely to protect 
its collateral through a veto power over transactions such as mergers 
and acquisitions or the sale of substantially all of the borrower's 
assets will not be considered the borrower's principal. Likewise, a 
lender with veto power over transactions which are above a certain 
dollar amount or who has the power to enforce rights of the borrower 
against a third party will not have vicarious liability for the acts of 
the borrower thrust upon it. 
Securities Liability Differs 
Both federal and most states' securities laws state that  a 
person who is in control of an  issuer of securities will be 
vicariously liable for such issuer's violation of the securities 
statutes. The meaning of the term "control" for securities law 
purposes is not the same as set forth in the partnership or agency 
analysis. In fact, the courts are somewhat split as to the standard 
to be applied for the imposition of liability. Some courts have held 
that for such liability to attach to a lender, the lender must have 
more than the mere right to control the transaction in question. 
Some evidence of actual participation in the securities law 
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violation is needed. Such is referred to as  t he  "culpable 
participation" r eq~ i remen t .~  The requirement that the lender 
have actual knowledge of the conduct and actively participate in 
the violation offers some fairly strong protection to lenders. That 
can be contrasted with a recent federal court opinion8 wherein it 
was stated that the right to control the transaction in question 
even without proof that such control was actually exercised could 
be enough to hold a lender vicariously liable for a borrower's 
securities law violation. Therefore, lenders which might be aware 
that an insolvent borrower is considering selling securities to raise 
capital should insist that the legality of any security offering be 
certified by independent counsel. 
Management has had to recognize the fact that lenders are 
increasingly wary of becoming entangled in the myriad legal 
problems which beset all hospitality operations. The effect has 
been a significant change in management procedures and 
attitudes for both borrower and lender. 
One such effect has been management's recognition of the 
dangers which accompany any delegation of management 
responsibility to a lender. Most lenders require some degree of 
control over the operations of the borrower if i t  is to make a 
participatory loan. Such loss of control over its own operation may 
not be desirable to management, especially if the lender to whom 
decision making authority is being delegated is not knowledgeable 
about the nature or operations of the borrower's business. A 
hospitality operator does not know how to manage the operations 
of a lending institution; why, then, should lenders be expected to 
know how to manage a hospitality operation? Clearly, a 
hospitality operator should be circumspect about delegating 
decision making authority to persons with little or no hospitality 
industry experience. 
Managers Must Explore Options 
Before entering into any participatory loan agreement with a 
lender, management must explore other, more traditional lending 
arrangements. Perhaps the obligation to re-pay the loan should be 
absolute and not contingent in any way on the success of the 
business. This would effectively exclude the  lender from 
participating in the business operations. However, lenders might 
find themselves unwilling to lend if the rewards it is to receive are 
not great enough, and, therefore, they might insist on a share of 
profits. Management's need for funds may be the determining 
factor when trade-offs with a lender are required. Ownership, 
profits, and control are surely the heart and soul of business 
ownership. Involving and permitting others to participate in this 
process must be evaluated carefully based on the willingness of 
lenders to make non-participatory loans and the borrower's need 
for financial support. 
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The risks which lender liability places upon a lender involved 
in a participatory loan with a hospitality operation are enormous. 
Should a borrower be determined by a court to be liable to a third 
party for breach of contract or for some violation of the law, not 
only does the lender risk the possible insolvency of the borrower 
and its inability to re-pay the loan, but the lender itself may have 
to step into the shoes of the borrower and make good on i ts  
obligation. 
A lender contemplating making such a loan must consider 
such potential liability. Perhaps such risks do not justify the 
return that such a loan would generate. If, after considering such 
risks, the lender concludes that such a loan would make economic 
sense, then  the  lender mus t  obtain legal advice so the  
responsibilities, duties, and respective authority of the partners 
can be clearly spelled out. The lender must be certain to obtain 
enough control in order to protect its interest in the business. It 
must then devote sufficient resources to properly and effectively 
exercise such control. 
The lender must also recognize its own infirmities with regard to 
its ability to manage the borrower's business. Just as a borrower 
should be circumspect about tendering control of its business to a 
lender which knows little about managing a hospitality operation, a 
lender must recognize that just because it is knowledgeable about 
the business of providing financial services, it may be quite ignorant 
about how to manage an ongoing business. If so, a wise lender would 
not enter into a participatory loan. 
The common thread running through all of the grounds upon 
which a lender might be held liable for the act of a borrower is 
control. A wise lender who recognizes the risks involved with 
participatory lending will refrain from exercising control over the 
day-to-day operations of the borrower unless i t  has  made a 
conscious decision that it wants the rewards associated with such 
a high risk loan and it dedicates the resources needed to properly 
and effectively participate in the borrower's business. A lender 
who does not wish to risk lender liability will be certain that the 
obligation of the  borrower to re-pay the  loan is  absolute, 
regardless of the success of the business, even if the lender is to 
receive a share of the profits as part of the consideration for 
making the loan. 
Owners and managers of hospitality operations, on the other 
hand, should be cautious as to their positions with lenders. The 
relationship could be one of bliss or one of courting disaster. The 
pros and cons of participatory loans, legal entanglements, risk 
venture, and overall control must be viewed with skepticism as well 
as opportunity. The uninformed borrower or lender is sure to suffer. 
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